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ABSTRACT
Customary organizational negotiations tend to focus efforts to attaining optimality in single-problem contexts that are both
disparate and temporary in nature. Once the negotiations are settled, the process usually attains closure and the long-term
impact of the outcome is rarely considered. In reality, however, decisions involving quid pro quos are made on a continuous
basis. Since organizational environments are constantly in flux, negotiated solutions that appeared successful on a given
problem at first no longer work out to be effective in the long run. We postulate that organizations evolve from one state to
another and with it new negotiations are initiated on a continual basis, one negotiation transitioning into another. From this
perspective, organizations can be modeled using sequential Markov chains that converge on homeostasis, leading to a
prescriptive approach for transitional negotiations that suggest acceptance of short term losses in favor of the better payoffs
that are to come.
Keywords
Negotiation support, computational modeling, cybernetics, organizational analysis.
INTRODUCTION
Organizations routinely make decisions that require consultations with multiple participants. Combining all points of view
towards a consensus acceptable to all parties is always a challenge.  A negotiation model imparting some degree of structure
and transparency in organizational interactions and suggesting long-term choice policies in an otherwise irrational backdrop
can be of valuable assistance to decision-makers.
Modern negotiation theory that finds its roots in decision theory and game theory focuses on interactive processes among
antagonists with the attempt to reach compromises, or better yet, a win-win agreement (Raiffa,Richardson and Metcalfe,
2003). With the recent interests in developing Web-based tools to support various types of negotiation activities on the
Internet (Ehtamo and Hamailainen, 2001; Kersten and Lo, 2003), the use of Negotiation Support Systems (NSS) tends to
focus on ad-hoc problems (e.g., e-auctions) or local optimizations (e.g., labor contract renewal in an overall context of
organizational decision-making).
In this paper, we look at negotiation in stochastic perspective. In each phase of the search for an organization action or policy,
members of the decision teams negotiate to define the attributes that guide them in the choice process, the states of the
organizations they want to reach, and the transitions and potential benefits associated with the selected action. At any given
moment, an organization can be characterized as belonging to a discrete organizational state. During the transitory existence
of the organization in such state, the decision makers endeavor to identify the state the organization is in and exercise one of
the action-choices that are available to them in that state. Stated thus, the organizational flux can be described as consisting of
a stream of theoretically infinite single-step state transitions in time, as the participants steer the organization through a series
of decisions. The motivation of the decision-makers is to collectively choose actions that maximize benefit over time for their
organizations.
ORGANIZATIONS AS COMPLEX SYSTEMS: COMPUTATIONAL THEORY BUILDING AND MODELING NEGOTIATION
PROCESSES
With the advent of information technology and its use in organizations, scientists in organization theory have recently revised
their 50-year old complex theory after a better understanding of the relation between the elements of organization design,
decision making and performance (Anderson, 1999; Pines, Gowan and Meltzer, 1999). Other theorists explored the processes
within organizations and their effects such as self-organization, bifurcation, and chaos (Dow and Earl, 1999). Another major
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direction of research leans toward building computational approaches to capture the dynamics of change and complexity,
innovation and evolution, coordination and cooperation, organization learning and knowledge management (Carley, 2003).
As the interest in computation increases, it is expected that new perspectives on organizations will emerge. We contend that
the views that organizations are composed of intelligent, adaptive and computational agents in which learning and knowledge
are distributed and where ecology of skills and social property come forward would be critical to designing effective
negotiation processes (Bui, 2000; Epstein and Axtell, 1997; Hutchins, 1995).
From a stochastic modeling perspective, we can define the decision process to have four steps. The process is triggered by the
discovery of organization members that the current state is not satisfactory and they engage in negotiating possible action
strategies for future states. Second, they identify alternative action strategies available in each state and estimate inter-state
transition probabilities. They then estimate the benefit when a certain action is taken, and finally, lay down a set of
organizational choice-policies for each state that would maximize the overall benefits in the long run. The underlying idea is
that what appears on the surface as random organizational behavior is most likely not random, but causal impacts of a series
of external events and internal choices that can be modeled as probabilistic phenomena.
THE STOCHASTIC NEGOTIATION MODEL
States and Attributes
During a given time interval, an organization is assumed to be in any one of a large number of possible decision states. A
state is represented by a specified collection of attributes and its values. A state can thus be designated by the notation, Zi
[(a1:v1),… , (an:vn)],  where  i  is  the  current  state  of  the  organization,  a1 thru an are the attribute names and v1 thru vn their
corresponding values.
In a negotiation setting, each party has an agenda/ goals and proposes the attribute(s) each would like included in measuring a
state. The outcome of this negotiation phase is the decision as to which attributes are to be included collectively in the model.
In our model, attribute values are in the range (0,1). Although infinite values are possible within this range, negotiators can
limit their attention to specific discrete values of interest to them. If an agreement was reached to have, say r values uniformly
distributed between 0 and 1, the possible attribute values can be calculated by the formula, vu = (u-1)/(r-1), where u = 1,… ,r.
Thus, if there are n attributes to a state and each attribute can take r values, it can be concluded there will be rn possible states
among which the organization can transition.
To illustrate the concepts, let us consider an example. AgriHydro operates a dam that draws its income from selling water to
farmers in its locality. The company is controlled by two board members, one representing the farmers and the other the
shareholders. Both members want to collaborate in identifying the possible organizational states the company may face. In
doing so, they identify two attributes that characterize each state (n=2). These are, a1: level of water in the dam, a2: level of
demand for water from farmers. Further, they agree that each attribute can have three possible values (r=3) in the range
[0,1)]. They are: 0 - low, 0.5 - medium and 1.0 - high. This leads to 9 (rn) possible finite states that AgriHydro can be in. They
can be expressed as, (a1:0, a2:0), (a1:0, a2:0.5), (a1:0, a2:1), (a1:0.5, a2:0), (a1:0.5, a2:0.5), (a1:0, a2:1), (a1:1, a2:0), (a1:1, a2:0.5),
(a1:1, a2:1). Assuming the attributes are always denoted sequentially, we can further reduce the nomenclature to represent
these states to (0,0,),… , (1,1) showing only the attribute values.
States and Choices
Decision-makers in the organization have any one of the possible action-choices, say c(1),… , c(m), that they may take for
each state. Negotiators have to decide explicitly what these are. Taking no action can also be a choice. In a collaborative
situation, the final actions-set will be the additive collection of the individual actions proposed by each participant. In an
antagonistic negotiation context, this may need to be settled using some mutually acceptable value-based criteria. Turning to
our example, two possible actions the board member for farmers may include are, (i) release water, and (ii) conserve water.
On the other hand, the board member representing the shareholders may consider looking at the two possible actions of (i)
raising the price for water and (ii) lowering the price of water.
State Transitions
The action chosen in a state moves the organization into a new state from among the possible states in the second time
interval. The intervals need not be equal. Only one action is allowed per interval. The movement from one state to another is
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considered a probabilistic event. The probability that the current state will transition from i to j due to action choice c(k) is
denoted by qijc(k). The new state j can be any of 1,… , n. The transition probabilities must satisfy the constraint,å j  qijc(k) = 1
(see Table 1).
New State
Z1 Z2 …  Zn
Z1,c(1) q11c(1) q12c(1) …  q1nc(1)
Z1,c(2) q11c(2) q12c(2) …  q1nc(2)
… … … …  …
Z1,c(m) q11c(m) q12c(m) …  q1nc(m)
Z2,c(1) q21c(1) q22c(1) …  q2nc(1)
… … … …  …
… … … …  …
C
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r  t
r  a
e t
n e
t
C
h
o
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c
e
s
Zn,c(m) qn1c(m) qn2c(m) …  qnnc(m)
Number of states = Z [1,… ,n]
Number of choices in each state = c (1,… ,m)
Table 1. An example transition probability matrix
Determining probability for each cell is a multi-step process. Since each state consists of n attributes and r possible values,
qijc(k)  is computed using the formula,
qijc(k)=(a1(r)ijc(k))*p(a2(r)ijc(k))*..*p(an(r)ijc(k))   (1)
qijc(k) is to be computed for each n and r attribute combinations. The process must be repeated for each action choice c(k). The
multiplicative form highlights the independence among the attribute values.
Even though the actions in each state affect the probabilities of transition from one state to another, it must be noted there
may be external random events that can influence the outcome. Therefore, negotiators have the job of evaluating these events
and adjusting the qijc(k) values while reaching a consensus. In addition to systematic elicitation of expert judgment, current
and historical data may need incorporation. There are many algorithms in literature for accomplishing this step.
Let us return to our example. We saw that there are 9 states denoted by the coordinates (0,0),… ,(1,1). Let the initial state be
Z1(0,0), and the terminal state be one of Zj where j=1,… ,9. Limit attention to choice c(1), conserve water. Using negotiation
between the board members, assess the probabilities that conserving water will transition attribute a1 (level of water in the
dam)  from  the  current  0  (low)  to  0.5  (medium)  or  1.0  (high)  states.  We  also  need  to  adjust  the  probabilities  to  take  into
account random external events such as potential rains in the area. Let the following values be the result of such negotiation.
Initial State a1=0 ; Choice
c(1) – Conserve water
p(a1(r)ijc(k))
Terminal State
a1=0 a1=0.5 a1=1
0.6 0.3 0.1
Table 2. Assigning transition probabilities at the attribute level
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We repeat the process for each of the attributes for the same choice. The transition probability is computed using formula (1).
The qijc(k)  values for the rest of the actions are determined using a similar approach.
Transition Benefit
Transition benefit is the income resulting from a transition during a period for implementing a specific choice. It can be either
a tangible benefit such as a dollar income or it can be an intangible benefit such as a gain in utility for the negotiators,
customer goodwill and the like. In the case of latter, external experts may need to be consulted in estimating the benefit
value. As for measuring the transition benefit in terms of utility for the negotiators, several sophisticated techniques are
available in literature. The simplest approach would be to take the average using the formula,
gi c(k) = åe UNeic(k) / N   (2)
where gi c(k) is utility benefit in state i due to choice c(k), N is the number of negotiators, UNe is the utility value as estimated
by the Neth negotiator.
Identification of a Choice Policy
Policy is a prescriptive function. Its purpose is to suggest which choice c(k) out of the possible set of choices must be acted
upon,  given  the  organization  is  in  state  Zi.  Such  a  policy  can  be  mathematically  stated  as  f(c|z)  where åc f(c|z)=1. Even
though states may be greater than n due to multiple attribute values, we adopt the conventional notation n in formulas 4-7.
If Zn is the current state and action c(m) was adopted, the conditional probability of transition can be stated as,
P[(z', c') | Zn, c(m)] = q (z'|z,c)* f(c'|z')   (3)
z' represents the subsequent state and c' represents the action taken while in this state.
We assume the transition probability matrix to be Markov chain compliant. By the basic limit theorem of Markov chains, the
long run mean income per unit interval g(f) would be equivalent to that under the stationary distribution.
g(f) = ¥®nlim   (1/n)
where ?(z,c) ?0 and
Using equations (4) and (5), we can generate (6) as follows,
?(z',c') =
From this, the policy f that maximizes the long run expected income per unit time can be calculated as shown in equation (7).
f(c'|z')  =   ?(z',c') /          ?(z',c)   (7)
Even if income levels were to fluctuate from one period to another over short periods, so long as the prescriptive policy is
adopted, it will not adversely affect the asymptotic long range performance. Solutions to these equations can be generated
using discrete stochastic dynamic programming formulations (Karlin and Taylor, 1984; Puterman, 1994).
From a cybernetic perspective, generating a choice policy is a learning process. The organization should continually examine
the outcomes following from the choices it made in the previous periods, reinforce the assessments of the attribute elements
and revise its battery of choices. Over an extended period, this results in the re-evaluation of the transition probability matrix
and consequently leads to a new set of choice policies.
COMPUTATIONAL ILLUSTRATION OF THE MODEL
In this section, we shall complete the example we began earlier for the AgriHydro company. Since the purpose is to illustrate
the model steps, we shall limit the problem further to two attributes, three states, and two actions per state. Note that we have
two negotiators in the company, one representing the customers and the other company's owners.
Step 1: Negotiate the attributes and their value sets.
å åå
= = =
(4)=
n
m
n
z
m
c
mcZngE
1 1 1
c)g(z,*c)(z,)](,([ p
åå
= =
(6)
n
z
m
c1 1
)z'|f(c'*c)z,|q(z'*c)(z,p
å
=
m
c 1
åå
= =
(5)=
n
z
m
c1 1
1c)(z,p
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Let us assume that both participants collectively agreed to use (i) level of water in the dam, and (ii) level of demand for water
from farmers as attributes. Each agrees to two possible values 0 and 1 for each attribute. This generates four possible states
AgriHydro can be in: Z(0,0), Z(0,1), Z(1,0) and Z(1,1). The state (0,0) represents the state where the water level in the dam is
low and the demand for water from the farmers is also low. The state (0,1) represents the state where the water level in the
dam is low but the demand for water from the farmers is high.  Similarly, the state (1,1) represents the state where both the
water level in the dam and the demand for water from the farmers are high.
Step 2: For each state, negotiate possible choices, c(k), where k=1,… ,m.
The resultant agreed choices will depend on how collaborative or antagonistic the negotiators were with respect to each
choice. In the former case, the various choices would be collected additively into the basket of action strategies. In the latter
case, give and take can be expected. The utility of having a choice in the basket for one negotiator at the expense of the other
may be compensated by a reciprocating gesture with regard to other choices. Let us assume that in our case, two choices were
agreed on: (i) release water, and (ii) conserve water.
Step 3: Evaluate the state transition probabilities.
We saw in Step 1 that AgriHydro can be in one of four states. In the current step, the task is to determine the probability that
a given state will remain in status quo or move to another in the next time interval as a result of taking either the conserve or
release-water actions. In our case, the structure of the transition probability matrix will look like below. (Note that in the
interest of computational simplicity, the state (1,0) has been ignored. Further, this situation where the water availability is
high but the demand is low is of little interest to decision-makers as its potential to generate income is trivial).
qijc(k) values for Table 3 can be calculated using formula (1) presented in the earlier discussion. For example, q11c(1) is
computed as shown below.
q11c(1)= p(a(1)0,0c(1))*p(a(2)0,0c(1))
In words, this means that the probability of remaining in state 1 with water level value at zero and water demand at zero from
one interval to the next when the action to release water has been taken is the product of the probability that the water level
value will remain at zero despite the water release and the probability that the water demand will remain at zero despite the
water release.
Terminal stateStarting
State
(i)
Attributes a1,a2
(Water level,
Water demand)
Actions
c(k)
1
(0,0)
2
(0,1)
3
(1,1)
k=1
Release
q11c(1)  q12c(1)  q13c(1)
1 (0,0)
k=2
Conserve
q11c(2) q12c(2) q13c(2)
k=1
Release
q21c(1) q22c(1) q23c(1)
2 (0,1)
k=2
Conserve
q21c(2) q22c(2) q23c(2)
k=1
Release
q31c(1)  q32c(1) q33c(1)
3 (1,1)
k=2 q31c(2) q32c(2) q33c(2)
Table 3. Structure of the transition probability matrix
The negotiators at this point will have to negotiate/decide on the values of  p(a(1)0,0c(1)) and p(a(2)0,0c(1). It is possible they
would rely on historical data or seek assistance from experts in the field in completing this task. Let us assume that in our
case p(a(1)0,0c(1)) = 0.75 and p(a(2)0,0c(1)= 0.27. Thus, q11c(1)= 0.20.
 We repeat the above process for each transition cell in Table 3. The final transition probabilities are shown in Table 4.
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Terminal stateStarting
State
(i)
Attributes a1,a2
(Water level,
Water demand)
Actions
c(k)
1
(0,0)
2
(0,1)
3
(1,1)
k=1  Release 0.2 0.6 0.2
1 (0,0) k=2 Conserve 0.4 0.3 0.3
k=1  Release 0.7 0.2 0.1
2 (0,1) k=2 Conserve 0.2 0.5 0.3
k=1  Release 0.1 0.7 0.2
3 (1,1) k=2 Conserve 0.8 0.1 0.1
Table 4. Final transition probability matrix for AgriHydro
Step 4: Determine the transition benefits.
Here, the participants have to assess the one period benefit function as a result of taking a specific action while in each of the
possible states. As discussed earlier, the benefit may consist of either tangible or intangible incomes. The latter case is more
complex. Formula 2 presented earlier can be used for this purpose. Let us assume the final agreed upon income matrix looks
as shown below. Unless tangible values such as dollars are involved, incomes are represented using numbers relative to each
other in size.
ActionState
Release
water
Conserve
water
(0,0) 1 2
(0,1) 5 3
Table 5. Benefit matrix for AgriHydro by state and action
Step 5: Apply a dynamic programming solution approach to determine the action-choice policy for each state.
The theory behind this step was presented in the earlier section. Formulas (4) thru (7) laid out the logic of the computations.
Solving these equations require that they be restructured in linear programming format. A variation of the approach consists
of solving the dual problem. The specific reiterative technique is referred to as the Howard's algorithm (Karlin and Taylor,
1984).
State Zi
i =
Choice Policy
c(k)
1 Conserve water
2 Release water
3 Release water
Table 6. Long-term policy
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The recommended long-run policy is shown in Table 6. These choices offer us the best chance that despite variations in
benefits from one state to another over short term, in the long run sticking to the action policy will tend to maximize mean
benefit of the inter-transitions.
ARCHITECTURE FOR A COMPUTERIZED SYSTEM
There are several benefits to implementing the above model as a computerized system. They are:
a. The computational requirements of dynamic programming can be handled easier
b. Negotiators who are dispersed geographically can participate in joint decisions over a network/Internet
c. Negotiations can take place asynchronously
d. Participants can maintain anonymity
e. Supporting experts in the field can join in discussions
f. External databases having historical data can be accessed
g. When negotiators want to perform modifications to inputs, the system can re-compute the results quickly leading
to faster agreements
Another important advantage of having a computerized system is that the parties to a negotiation can try out different
simulated scenarios for themselves. This will allow them to get better acquainted with the organizational context before they
enter the real negotiation session. By simulating various portfolios of attributes, states, transitions and potential benefits in
virtual sessions, they can familiarize themselves with the sensitivity of the different stochastic model parameters. It will also
enable them to ascertain in advance which elements would matter most in the negotiation process and yield them insights into
alternative stake out positions. They can build an understanding early on of what negotiation strategies might work for them
and develop a plan of action accordingly before ever coming face-to-face with their counterparts. It could also give them an
idea as to what the other parties might bring to the negotiation table and help them in preparing defensive/counter strategies
ahead of time. This functionality of individual simulation using the computerized system is illustrated by the dotted rectangle
in Figure 1.The figure also shows the architecture of the various system components and human negotiators/experts.
Attribute synthesizer
This module interacts with the negotiators and gathers the names of the attributes each participant considers as necessary to
describe the organizational state. Once the attribute collection phase is completed from each human negotiator, the module
identifies a common set of attributes acceptable to all parties. Only a single additive step is needed in a collaborative
environment. When consensus is hard to reach, the module requests participants to rank the attributes and/or asks them to
assign normalized weights to each. From this information, the module computes a starting set of attributes.
State composer
Once the attributes has been agreed upon, the next step is to compute all possible states for these attributes. The State
composer component begins its work first by prompting the negotiators to input the number of intervals they would like to
divide the attribute value range (0,1). Using a nested programming approach, the composer is able to enumerate every
possible combination of these attribute values and coordinate them to capture the set of discrete states the organization can
potentially be in. This gives a great advantage to the participants since they need not be limited by their inability to process a
large number of organizational states on their own. However, since the number of states rises exponentially with the number
of attributes and their intervals, the module gives the users the option to eliminate states that they believe are of little interest.
In fact, in our AgriHydro example, such a situation was discussed whereby the negotiators decided to remove the state
represented by the coordinates (Water level=1, Water demand=0).
Choices assembler
Having identified potential states the organization can be in, the next step is to synthesize what negotiators consider as
action-choices applicable to each state. The Choices assembler module accomplishes this by presenting the individual states
and receiving inputs from the users in the form of the different decisions they can make under each state. The module has
access to the Knowledge manager component as well as internal and external databases which enable the system to benefit
from decisions made in the historical past. External advice from consultants/ experts may also be incorporated. Thus, it can
complement the actions directly suggested by the users through the system input interface. The Choice assembler has also the
task to generate a consensual set of actions for each state if negotiators don't see eye to eye at the first round of bargaining.
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Figure 1.   Components of the Stochastic Negotiation System
Q-estimator
The Q-estimator elicits from each negotiator the transition probabilities of each attribute moving from its current state into
any of the other possible states that have been identified by the State composer module. The component asks the parties
through its interface to input the estimates for each of the choices recognized by the Choices assembler. This component has
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also the traditional negotiation techniques built into it to assist the parties to converge to a common acceptable value should
disagreements arise. It has also access to the Knowledge manager and the databases that contains data from previous periods.
Further, the system can supply information from external consultants and experts to help the negotiators in generating the
probability estimations. Once the probabilities of transition for each attribute have been determined, Q-estimator combines
the information to derive the state transition probabilities using formula (1) and saves them to the system's internal database.
Contradicting attributes will be assigned very near zero-values for transition probabilities to obviate their impact on final
solution.
Benefit estimator
This module captures from the negotiators what they consider as the potential income during a period for every action while
in a possible state. Once again, the component can also draw conclusions from system resources based on past data. Bayesian
estimates can be used to refine data stored in the databases to improve the quality of prediction. Where negotiators diverge on
their estimates, the system can help bridge the gap by facilitating iterative sessions.
Group norm constructor
This is a crucial module in that it controls the intercommunications among the rest of the components using a set of pre-
drawn criteria mutually accepted by the negotiators. It facilitates exchange of information through use of blackboard memory
as well as software agents to perform various services. One of the important functions it performs is to collect all the
information generated by the state composer, choices assembler, q-estimator and benefit estimator modules and direct them
to the dynamic program solver. When the group norms are violated, the appropriate agents are fired. Many of these agents are
triggers and hence automatically get invoked when the occurrence of a designated event is detected by the system (Bui,
1987).
Knowledge manager
Organizations cumulatively perform an enormous number of transactions over long periods of time. Successful organizations
store these information in data warehouses and detect patterns through data mining operations. These learnt patterns can be
very helpful while assessing future organizational attributes, inter-state transition probabilities, what actions worked and
didn't in the past and benefit matrices. The component also stores the expertise that decision-makers have learnt through their
experience. They are typically represented in the form of if-then production rules using artificial intelligence techniques.
Potential combinatorial explosion is greatly reduced using these rules. The knowledge manager has also access to both
internal and external databases to complement its own data.
Dynamic program solver
This component has both linear programming formulation and solving abilities. Depending on the complexity of the problem
at hand, the component can either solve the original linear programming equations or can reformulate them into a dual
problem and then perform the simplex algorithm on it.  When appropriate, it  can also look for solutions using the trial and
error  approach  as  described  by  the  Howard's  algorithm.  The  module  works  seamlessly  with  the  group  norm  constructor
exchanging information back and forth. This feature is extremely useful when negotiators fiddle with their original inputs and
want to assess the impact instantaneously. As mentioned earlier, when users want to perform simulation and sensitivity
analysis either on an individual basis or in a real world negotiation context, dynamic program solver facilitates the generating
of the ultimate solutions negotiators are looking for quickly and efficiently. The feasibility and reasonableness of solutions
are assured through the currency and proper assignment of the transition probabilities by the Q-estimator module.
CONCLUSION
When organizations face consequences of their own past decisions as well as that of external random events, it is hard to
predict where the organization will be at a future time. In this research, we assume that organizations progress from one state
to another following a probabilistic transition pattern rather than in a totally random manner. By so hypothesizing,
organizations can be modeled as using sequential Markov chains with a predisposition to achieve homeostasis.
Understanding organizational behavior from this perspective can be greatly beneficial to negotiators by enabling them to
accept short term losses in favor of the larger and better payoffs that may come to fruition in the distant future.
The model presented in this paper integrates techniques developed in negotiation support discipline with the benefits of
depicting organizations as complex probabilistic systems. By representing an organization's evolution as conforming to
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stochastic processes, the proposed model obviates the assumptions of anarchy and irrationality ordinarily imposed to
comprehend decision-making in such environments. Yet, it accounts for the randomness of the events in the organizational
environment and guides decisions towards better states in the future for the organization to flourish. Lastly, far from being a
mere theoretical tool, the model provides a practical approach to improving efficiency and effectiveness that directly benefits
an organization's performance.
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